The research seminar at the Department of philosophy will meet on thursday, 24.9 at 16-18 (Unioninkatu 40 A [Helsinki], 1st floor, room A 110):
Rupert Read (UEA): Wittgenstein vs. Rawls
The seminar is open for all, including students. Welcome!
Full paper: http://www.helsinki.fi/filosofia/tutkijaseminaari/Wittgenstein%20vs%20Rawls.doc
ABSTRACT:
Many philosophers influenced by Wittgenstein but holding highly divergent readings of Wittgenstein find themselves in agreement on one thing: Rawls is compatible with Wittgenstein, and Rawls is on the right track so far as political philosophy is concerned. I argue by contrast that Rawls's work is incompatible with the core of what it is to be a Wittgensteinian. Chiefly for these three reasons:
• Rawls’s taking of justice as the first virtue of social institutions is problematic; he more or less assumes this (whereas Wittgenstein would consider other possibilities), and the content of the assumption is in any case very questionable.
• The heart of Rawlsian thinking is, surprisingly, non-action-guiding. Both the difference principle and the ‘just savings’ principle are open invitations to bad faith. This is because they are non-genuine contracts which nevertheless in some sense pretend to be as-if contracts. An analogy is drawn with Wittgenstein’s anti-‘private-language’ consideration, which are directed against the ‘idea’ of a non-language which nevertheless in some sense pretends to be a language.
• Rawlsian thinking (see e.g. the previous point) is, I claim, fundamentally dishonest. Whereas honesty is the paramount watchword of Wittgenstein’s thinking.